INTRODUCTION
Imagine an up-and-coming company hires you as one of its first employees. Passionate about your employer, you put in long hours doing everything from marketing to accounting to event planning. You are also proud of your employer's product, so you begin to publicize it to your friends through your social network accounts. (In fact, the company's founder is also one of your Facebook friends.) You tell your friends about the product launch, invite them to marketing events, and eventually blog about your industry, amassing a significant social media following while creating buzz about your employer. But one day, during layoffs unrelated to your own efforts, you are fired. As you walk out the door, your supervisor asks you to return the office keys, your parking pass, and . . . administrative rights to your social media profiles. Can this be?
The term "social media" encompasses any online platform that allows individuals to communicate, create content, and interact socially.
1 Social media can include blogs, wikis, podcasts, photos and video sharing, virtual worlds, and social networking sites such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.
2 For individuals, social media can be the digital representation of the self online. Social media profiles are fora for communication, self-expression, identity creation, and relationship-building in front of audiences of few or many. The phenomenon of social media-and its use in business-is less than a decade old. 3 It is thus no surprise that both normative and legal questions regularly test its limits.
The ubiquity and accessibility of social media has proven enticing to businesses and 4
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resolve these issues? Or is intellectual property or tort law better suited to address them? We assert that the conundrum surrounding the applicable law is due in part to a lack of understanding of the exercise and value of social media in the business context. To that end, Part II analyzes social media through the lens of social science and business, describing it with five fundamental tenets that can ultimately inform its legal protection. Social media audience management is a creative, dynamic, and generative process whose fruits-networked relationships-can be inextricably interwoven with the individual. Given this intimate tie to personhood and the complexity of extricating the personal from the professional, Part III proposes a multifactor framework grounded in a theory of publicity rights to guide its resolution. With roots in both privacy and property, publicity rights protect the unjustified commercialization or exploitation of another's name, likeness, reputation, accomplishments, or endorsement. 14 The right recognizes that intangible fruits of one's persona carry value, which must be protected in the vein of property. 15 Since social media is the dominant disseminator of publicity today and it offers widespread notoriety to many, adopting a framework informed by the well-established law of publicity rights is both logical and desirable.
I. THE UNTETHERED LAW OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN SOCIAL MEDIA
Given the ubiquity of social media as a marketing tool and its blurring of personal and professional, it is hardly surprising that employees have begun to defend their rights and creations in social media. Four recent cases-PhoneDog v. Kravitz, 16 Eagle v. Morgan, 17 
Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group, 18 and Mattocks v. Black Entertainment Television LLC
19 -elucidate this burgeoning legal issue in diverse industries and on varied social media sites. In this section, we first briefly discuss the cases and their holdings. We then examine in more detail the various legal claims and arguments put forth by the litigants. Their analysis sheds light on the current confusion regarding applicable law and uncovers some fundamental misconceptions about social media, both of which must be clarified for a coherent solution to emerge.
A. Four Representative Cases
In PhoneDog v. Kravitz 2016 / Digital-Self Ownership 5 and reviews about cellular phones and mobile devices. In April 2006, PhoneDog hired Noah Kravitz as a product reviewer and video blogger. 20 In this capacity, Kravitz was charged with submitting written and video content, which PhoneDog then disseminated to its users through a variety of online mediums, including its website and Twitter account. 21 As part of his employment, Kravitz was given a Twitter account named "@PhoneDog_Noah" for which he created a password. 22 In his four years with PhoneDog, Kravitz accumulated approximately 17,000 Twitter followers. 23 When Kravitz resigned in 2010, PhoneDog demanded he hand over the use of his Twitter account, which he had popularized during his tenure at PhoneDog. 24 But PhoneDog did not have a policy regarding retention of social media accounts. 25 Kravitz refused, and, in protest, continued to use the account to communicate with his followers but changed the handle from "@PhoneDog_Noah" to "@noahkravitz."
26 PhoneDog claimed that the Twitter password was a trade secret, and its continued unauthorized use was misappropriation, and sued Kravitz on four claims: 1) misappropriation of trade secrets; 2) conversion; and 3) intentional and 4) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. 27 Could a Twitter password be a trade secret-a proprietary interest capable of being misappropriated by its own creator?
Employee Kravitz argued that the password to the Twitter account could not be a trade secret because it was neither valuable nor secret. Passwords, he argued, could carry no actual or economic value because they merely allow individuals to login to an account to view information. Moreover, Kravitz himself created the password, and his employer made no attempt to secure its secrecy. 28 On Kravitz's motion to dismiss, the court dismissed the claims for intentional and negligent interference, but allowed the claims for conversion and misappropriation of trade secrets to go forward, accepting (for purposes of ruling on the motion to dismiss) that under certain circumstances a Twitter password could be a trade secret. 29 The parties eventually entered into a confidential settlement that allowed Kravitz to maintain sole custody of the Twitter account and its thousands of followers. 30 The case settled amidst public confusion and 20 PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612 at *1. 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id. 25 Id. at *4. 26 Id. at *1. 27 Id. 28 Id. at *6. 29 Id. at *7-10; see also Argento, supra note 11, at 266 (noting that "in the trade secret context, a court must carefully scrutinize the circumstances and the objective manifestations of each party to determine the nature of the agreement"); David S. 32 At the enthusiastic urging of Edcomm's then-CEO, Eagle "created her own LinkedIn account using her Edcomm email address," engaging on the site on both her personal and her company's behalf. 33 Through this social network, Eagle promoted the company's services, fostered her reputation, stayed connected with friends and family, and built social and professional relationships. 34 Eagle's assistant had access to her account for the purpose of managing and updating its content.
35
LinkedIn's User Agreement made explicit that users owned their accounts and were individually bound to the User Agreement, regardless of whether their use was on behalf of an employer. 36 Although Edcomm neither required employees to use Linkedin nor paid for its employees' LinkedIn accounts, it provided them certain guidelines as to posted content. 37 However, these guidelines did not address the company's right to access or control the accounts.
38
After Edcomm was sold, the new owners terminated Eagle and hired Sandi Morgan in her place. 39 Edcomm then accessed Eagle's LinkedIn account and changed the password and the account profile to display Morgan's name and photograph. 40 For approximately two weeks, Eagle was locked out of what she believed to be "her" LinkedIn account, causing her to lose messages and feel that her virtual personality had been hijacked. 41 During this time, an Internet search for Eagle's name produced the LinkedIn account that bore Morgan's name and likeness. 42 Although Edcomm returned the account to Eagle within a month, she sued her former company and the individuals involved for a medley of claims: (1) unauthorized use of name; (2) invasion of privacy by misappropriation of identity; (3) misappropriation of publicity; (4) identity theft; (5) conversion; (6) tortious interference with contract; (7) civil conspiracy; and (8) civil aiding and abetting. 43 Was the nature of Eagle's harm dignitary, proprietary, or both? What would be its kravitz-lawsuit-twitter. 31 No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id.
35 Id. at *3. 36 Id. at *1. 37 Id. 38 Id. 39 Id.
40 Id. at *3. 41 See id. at *10. 42 Id. at *3. 43 Id. at *6. In an earlier 2012 decision in the case, the court dismissed the federal law claims alleging violation of 44 Edcomm was awarded judgment on the counts of identity theft, conversion, tortious interference with contract, civil conspiracy, and civil aiding and abetting, 45 and the court dismissed Edcomm's counterclaim that Eagle had actually misappropriated the LinkedIn account as her own. 46 Eagle, did, however, succeed on her claims for unauthorized use of name (in violation of Pennsylvania law), misappropriation of publicity, and invasion of privacy by misappropriation of identity-a tort prohibiting both the commercial and noncommercial use of another's image or likeness. 47 The court acknowledged that Edcomm had improperly usurped Eagle's digital persona to her detriment. 48 The court reasoned that by virtue of the existence of her LinkedIn membership, Eagle had a contractual relationship with LinkedIn and noted that the LinkedIn User Agreement clearly indicated that the individual user controlled the account. 49 By entering her account and changing her password, Edcomm had acted with purpose or intent to harm Eagle by preventing that relationship from continuing. 50 The court concluded that Eagle had proved tortious interference by her employer but failed to prove any damages with reasonable certainty. 51 It noted that "[a]side from her own selfserving testimony that she regularly maintained business through LinkedIn, Plaintiff failed to point to one contract, one client, one prospect, or one deal that could have been, but was not obtained during the period she did not have full access to her LinkedIn account."
52
The court further held that even if Eagle "had made a showing of a 'fair probability' that she sustained some damages [,] . . . she failed to provide a reasonably fair basis for calculating such damages."
53 Although Eagle succeeded in her privacy cause of action, the court awarded neither compensatory nor punitive damages. 54 Thus, even when a plaintiff has a valid cause of action in a post-employment social media dispute, it is not clear whether the plaintiff is limited to equitable remedies alone. 59 Per Facebook's policy, a company page can only be created through a personal Facebook account. 60 As a result of this policy, Maremont created and accessed SFDG's company Facebook page required through her personal account. 61 Maremont was also a frequent contributor on Twitter, on behalf of SFDG and on her own behalf. 62 She stored various social media passwords on an electronic spreadsheet on an SFDG-owned computer. 63 Maremont was seriously injured in an automobile accident, which caused her to temporarily abandon her job and all social media communications. 64 SFDG's own marketing efforts continued in spite of Maremont's absence.
65 During Maremont's convalescence, SFDG accessed and posted seventeen times from her Twitter account without her consent. Some postings notified readers that the account would be maintained by her temporary replacement. 66 Other messages were in the first person, giving readers the impression that she wrote them. 67 Act; 70 and (4) a common law right to privacy.
71
In March 2011, the court dismissed Maremont's common law invasion of privacy claim, holding that the Illinois Right of Publicity Act replaced the common-law tort of appropriation of likeness. 72 Maremont maintained that she had "sufficiently alleged two other common law invasion of privacy torts: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another and (2) a claim based on publicity that reasonably places another in a false light before the public." 73 The court disagreed, holding that Maremont:
fail[ed] to develop her argument that Defendants' intrusion into her personal "digital life" is actionable under the common law theory of unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. Meanwhile, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in Maremont's favor, she has failed to sufficiently allege a false light claim because she has not alleged that Defendants acted with actual malice, nor has she alleged special damages.
74
In December 2011, the court granted summary judgment to SFDG on the Illinois right of publicity claim as well as a renewed common-law right of privacy claim-intrusion upon seclusion. 75 The court held that Maremont failed to meet the elements of the Right of Publicity Act-(1) an appropriation of one's name or likeness; (2) without written consent; and (3) for another's commercial benefit-because SFDG did not appropriate Maremont's identity. 76 76 Id. at *7. 77 Id. 78 Id. at *8. To prove an intrusion upon seclusion claim, a plaintiff must show "(1) an unauthorized intrusion into seclusion; (2) the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; (3) the matter intruded upon was private; and (4) 87 Mattocks's fan page was not official, nor did it initially contain BETsponsored content. 88 However, it amassed two million "likes" and, in 2010, caught the attention of executives at BET. 89 In January 2011, BET hired Mattocks on a part-time basis to manage the show's Facebook page.
90 Upon Mattocks's employment, BET began to supply her with exclusive and copyrighted content and to prominently display its trademarks on her Facebook page, which subsequently became official and whose likes grew to six million. 91 One month later, the parties agreed to share administrative rights over the page, meaning that they could not prevent one another from posting content, making changes, or accessing the page or its audience.
92
Despite a seemingly fruitful union, the relationship severed. In June of the following year, as Mattocks and BET negotiated her possible full-time employment, Mattocks unilaterally restricted BET's administrative access to the page and informed it that she would do so "[u]ntil 80 Id. 81 Id. To recover under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff "must show that she 'suffered actual injury, i.e., a loss of sales, profits, or present value (goodwill),' or that Defendants were unjustly enriched." Id. (citations omitted). At her deposition, Maremont denied suffering any financial injury, admitting that her damages claim was limited to mental distress. Later-after the close of discovery-Maremont claimed that she was entitled to a portion of SFDG's gross sales for the period during which SFDG posted to her social media accounts. Id. Because the latter damages were never disclosed during discovery, the court struck Maremont's evidence related to that claimed injury. Without a "basis from which to award Maremont any recovery if she succeeded in proving her Lanham Act claim," the court granted SFDG summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim. Id. at *5. 82 Id. at *7 (citations omitted). 83 87 Id. at 1314-15. 88 Id. at 1315. 89 Id. at 1316. 90 Id. at 1315. 91 Id. at 1316. 92 
Id.
2016 / Digital-Self Ownership 11 such time as we can reach an amicable and mutually beneficial resolution" concerning her employment. 93 In reaction, BET created another official Facebook page for the series and asked Facebook to migrate the likes on the Mattocks-created page to its new page. 94 Facebook granted BET's request after its internal review determined that the new page was in fact the now-official representative of the brand owner. 95 BET was also able to disable the Twitter account used by Mattocks to promote the show. 96 Mattocks sued BET for (1) tortious interference with contractual relationships she had with Facebook and Twitter; (2) breach of employment contract; (3) breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) conversion of business interest. 97 BET prevailed on all of the claims at the summary judgment stage. As to the tortious interference claim, Mattocks did not succeed because BET was not a stranger to the contract between Mattocks and Facebook. 98 Because of the contract between Mattocks and BET and BET's prior control over content posted on Mattocks's page, BET had a financial interest in the contractual relationship between Mattocks and Facebook. 99 BET was also awarded summary judgment on the breach of contract and breach of good faith and fair dealing claims because Mattocks had first breached the contract by restricting BET's access to the Facebook page. 100 Finally, Mattocks's conversion claim rested on whether an intangible "like" could be a verifiable business interest. Mattocks alleged that the "substantial interest" in the Facebook page and the "significant number of 'Likes'" she generated provided her with business opportunities-opportunities BET willfully deprived her of by transferring the likes to a different page. 101 The court, however, held that Mattocks could not establish that she owned a property interest in the Facebook likes.
102 Furthermore, even if she could have established a property interest, she could not prove that BET's migration request was unauthorized or wrongful. 103 Kravitz, Eagle, Maremont, and Mattocks created social media exposure for their employers through the use of their individual skills, contacts, and social media identities. Like many other employees today, they operated in an uncertain environment. On one hand, they were encouraged to promote their firms online (and indeed, for some, it was part of the job). On the other hand, the control over the fruits of their labor was left entirely undefined. None had contracts making explicit their rights (or lack thereof) in their social media accounts or 93 Id. (alteration in original). 94 Id. 95 Id. at 1317. 96 Id. 97 Id. 98 Id. at 1319. 99 Id.
12
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audiences. Yet, the four employees shared strong entitlements, which may or may not be acknowledged by current law.
Although they sued on diverse and questionably applicable claims, these cases boil down to the employees' entitlement over their digital self-ownership. The employees' ire grew out of their need to: (1) continue to access the social media audiences they attracted, (2) control their own online identities, and (3) sever the association between their online personae and their former firms, so as to prevent the former employers from trading on their personal reputation and social media relationships. The outcomes of these contentious cases would impact not only the employees' identities, but also their abilities to exercise their trades and communicate with their online cohorts.
As Table 1 illustrates, the lawsuits focus on disparate legal claims, from personal property to privacy, tort to intellectual property-as if to test which would best apply. Indeed, litigants, courts, and commentators, clearly uncertain about applicable law, have conceptualized the reality and rights associated with a social media profile in a variety of different ways. Deeper analysis of these claims is necessary to understand how the law can and should provide a remedy to social media litigants.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
B. A Mixed Bag of Legal Claims
Before analyzing the various claims in detail, it is helpful to parse the discrete aspects of social media to which litigants may feel entitled. 104 A cursory analysis of the popular press and blogosphere reveals confusion about the legal rights a person has to his social media accounts.
105
Articles about the PhoneDog and Eagle cases often include the word "ownership" in the title, 106 or profess to cover the topic of ownership of online accounts.
107 Some courts have also referred to "ownership" of social media accounts. 108 Although they generally demonstrate society's disorientation regarding who controls social media accounts, the slippery semantics are also misleading as to the law. The legal reality is that social media accounts are comprised of a bundle of rights, not all of which are legally recognized.
On a basic level, an employee might claim rights to the content on the social media page, such as text, pictures, and logos. The right to posted content is beyond the scope of this inquiry because it is addressed by referring to established tenets of intellectual property law and the terms and conditions of the host websites. The harder questions-and the ones with which the law has struggled-involve the continued right to access and control the account and retain its amassed audience. Among other exercises, the right to control the account allows its holder to continue using the medium as a platform for speech and to make administrative and content changes (including limiting membership). Such was the dispute in Eagle and Maremont. The right to "keep" or "take" the account's membership allows its holder to either migrate the audience to another social media account (unrelated to the employer or employee) or, more generally, retain the ability to continue contacting them. 109 This was the nature of the dispute in PhoneDog 110 and Mattocks. 111 We will refer to the interests related to the rights to access and control the account, as well as the right to retain the audience, as "administrative rights."
112 After a brief discussion of claims regarding content posted to a social media site, we will turn to an analysis of administrative rights, considering the issue through the lens of the laws of (1) trade secret, (2) contract, (3) personal property, and (4) privacy.
Intellectual property law governs any personal property interest in content posted on social media profiles. 113 Social media content is the subject of a copyright or trademark, especially in a business context. Social media posts, photos, and videos are protected by copyright. Trademark law protects a company name and logo. Aside from content that is protected by a company's trademarks or copyrights, users are the sole owners of the content posted on their social media profiles. All three major social networking sites-Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter-give users ownership over the content of their profiles. 114 In other words, while the social media sites maintain ownership of the actual accounts, 115 they stake no claim to user-generated content-the user retains the intellectual property rights to his creations.
The sites' terms of service governing user rights are written for individuals, not necessarily businesses who employ individuals to speak for them. 116 In the absence of a contract or policy outlining the post-employment retention of intellectual property rights to content posted on social media, employers and former employees will be forced to duke it out on traditional copyright theories of work-made-for-hire and joint authorship. If the posts were made in the employee's scope of employment, 117 copyright law's work-made-for-hire doctrine would apply and the employer will hold all rights to the work. 118 If the employee did not author the posts as part of his job, the content on the company profile might be considered a work of joint authorship. Under this theory, both parties are coauthors and co-owners and have the ability to restrict changes to the work, the use of their name, and claim to authorship. 119 These legal theories are well established; their applicability in any given case relies heavily on the circumstances of each case.
Intellectual property law addresses only the issue of who retains rights to the content posted on a social media account. It does not directly address the issue at the core of the cases discussed in this article-the right to access and control of the account itself and its associated audience. Plaintiffs typically allege a host of varied and often-unsuccessful claims, including violations of trade secret (regarding the account's password), privacy, and contract law. Some have also alleged conversion and other property-related claims. These different claims through which litigants have presented rights in a social media profile and its related audience have merit, although a closer look reveals their limitations. We address the merits and drawbacks of trade secret, contract, personal property, and privacy, in turn.
1.
Trade Secret
Some plaintiffs have claimed that social media passwords are trade secrets and their continued unauthorized use constitutes misappropriation. 120 Other litigants have gone further, claiming that the list of social media friends or followers was, itself, a trade secret. 121 Can a password or a social media audience be a trade secret?
A determination of whether information, be it a username and password or a social media audience, rises to the level of a trade secret is a highly fact-specific inquiry that will depend upon an analysis of several factors.
First, it must not be generally known or readily ascertainable to those who might obtain economic value from its use. In other words, it must be secret, at least with regard to potential competitors. Second, the information must derive independent economic value from being secret. Third, the information must be subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.
122
One scholar has argued that account access information (specifically a username and password) meets the three requirements to be a trade secret. Professor Argento argues:
The secret of access to the social network account-the password-should be protectable as a trade secret. A password's secrecy confers independent economic value by giving the account holder exclusive access to the links in the account. This trade secret protection, however, would be highly limited. It would protect only access to the account, but not any content otherwise available to the public. Crucially, any other user could still contact the account's followers through other accounts. Although narrow, trade secret protection would protect the interest at the Vol. 53 / American Business Law Journal heart of these disputes: the right to retain exclusive access to the account's followers. 123 Argento's analysis, although compelling, falls short. A username and password that grant access to a profile simply do not have independent economic value and thus cannot be a trade secret. Access information can be analogized to keys to a safe deposit box. The value of the keys, like a username and password, is arguably temporary because they are only the means with which to retrieve the property or information contained inside. Without content to be accessed, the keys have no value. Once those assets are accessed, the keys are inconsequential. Their value is not independent, but in fact is dependent upon the desirability or value of the contents they unlock. Indeed, just as physical keys and locks can be changed, passwords can also be easily altered, rendering the prior version valueless. 124 Further, relying on the flimsy trade secrecy of passwords leaves the social media audience unprotected. As we have contended, the interest at the heart of these disputes centers on administrative rights-the continued ability to interact with an audience, not the one-time access to the profile.
Application of trade secret law to social media audiences is similarly problematic. Can social media relationships or contacts ever be trade secrets? Such a claim has arisen in at least two recent cases, with little resolution. In CDM Media USA, Inc. v. Simms, 125 a marketing company claimed that a former employee misappropriated a trade secret when he continued to use the LinkedIn group that he created during his employment. Although the court denied a motion to dismiss, it suggested that whether the list of its 679 members constituted a trade secret would depend on information regarding the contents, configuration, and function of the LinkedIn group. 126 A second case, Christou v. Beatport, LLC, involves a long battle between nightclub owners and a former employee-turned-competitor regarding the right to access a MySpace profile and control the contacts associated with the account. 127 The former employer claimed that the lists of friends associated with its social media profiles were trade secrets. 128 The defendants argued that such contacts could not possibly constitute trade secrets because they were available to the public and not secret. 129 The Christou court, ruling on a motion to dismiss, found that the question of whether a social media contact list was a trade secret is a question of fact, and that the plaintiffs had alleged enough facts to withstand a motion to dismiss. 130 Given that both of these cases concluded at the preliminary motion to dismiss stage, they provide little guidance. 123 Argento, supra note 11, at 205 (footnotes omitted). 124 128 Id. at 1074. 129 Id. at 1074-75. 130 Id. at 1076. In a March 31, 2014 Order, the judge ruled that the trade secret claims, withdrawn by the plaintiffs during trial, were not made in bad faith as there was evidence the Myspace password was taken, but the Order does not elaborate on whether it is a trade secret. See Christou v. Beatport, LLC, No. 10-cv-02912-RBJ-KMT, 2014 WL Many scholars and courts have viewed a social media audience as simply a subscriber or customer list. 131 Under this perspective, determining rights to a social media audience through a trade secret analysis makes sense, since trade secret law is the traditional method of protection for a customer list. However, as will be explained in Part II, this characterization of a social media audience will often be overly simplistic and outdated. It breaks down when applied to the reality of a social media audience, which is fluid and dynamic rather than a static list of names.
132
The Christou court hinted at recognition of the richness of a social media audience. The judge wrote:
Social networking sites enable companies. . . to acquire hundreds and even thousands of "friends." These "friends" are more than simple lists of names of potential customers. "Friending" a business or individual grants that business or individual access to some of one's personal information, information about his or her interests and preferences, and perhaps most importantly for a business, contact information and a built-in means of contact.
133
Although an encouraging step, this limited view continues to miss the broader perspective. The likes and dislikes frequently found on a social media profile have more significance than simply providing information about those contacts; instead they often become part of the user's profile, much of which is visible to the broader audience. 134 While in some circumstances a contact list may indeed meet the criteria required to establish a trade secret, a social media audience encompasses far more than a simple list of contacts. The focus on trade secrets misses the essential point about the value of a social media audience, which is found not by focusing on each individual contact, and placing a monetary value on that particular relationship. Instead, the value lies in the audience as a whole and the impact it has on the user's online persona. 133 Christou, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. 134 Indeed, a visible list of contacts negates the possibility of a trade secret. See McLaughlin, supra note 10, at 106 ("Finding that these user accounts are eligible for trade-secret protection seems entirely antithetical to social media's purpose in the workplace. Simply stated, professional networking requires public exposure."); McNealy, supra note 122, at 50 ("The purpose of social media is to share and consume information. Connections are public, and meant to be so. A business using an SNS [(social network site)] platform to generate customers does not change the fact that anyone with an Internet connection can view the business's list of friends or followers.") (footnotes omitted). 135 Miao suggests that a list of contacts associated with an online social media account may not rise to the level of a trade secret because the subscribers themselves choose to remain on the list. See Miao, supra note 12, at 1050; see also Walker, supra note 131. While interesting, the changing nature of a contact list audience does not necessarily mean it is incapable of ownership. Other lists that may be a trade secret can easily be unsubscribed to, yet that does not negate the possibility of ownership.
18
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Contract
Contract law provides two possible avenues of analysis. First, the Terms of Service agreement (ToS) between the employee who created the profile and the social media site might provide a basis for an interference with contract claim, as was the case in Eagle. 136 Second, employment agreements may dictate the disposition of administrative rights when the employment relationship ends. However, such agreements may be an unlawful restraint of trade, as we explain in more detail at the end of this subpart.
137
Terms of Service agreements govern the relationship between a social media site and its users. In creating social media accounts, users enter into these agreements individually with the website. They typically govern how the account can be used, who can use and access the account, and what content can be posted. 138 For example, Facebook and LinkedIn require users to have personal profiles before creating pages for businesses. The individual user/creator, not the business he represents, is held responsible under the site's terms of service.
139
When a former employer revokes access to the social media audience cultivated by the employee, some former employees have sued for tortious interference with contractual relations, a common law tort arising out of a third party's intentional interference with a contract expectancy that leads to damages. 140 Under this theory, the employers acted intentionally to induce a breach of the terms and conditions-and their ensuing rights-vis-à-vis the social media websites. Employees, however, have thus far not been successful in asserting this tort in this context. Both Eagle and Mattocks suggest that agents are likely to have a hard time proving the elements of the tort. In addition to the courts' reluctance to find in favor of employees regarding their ToS arguments, their application as a method of resolving disputes fails to acknowledge the interests involved. ToS agreements are written generically to apply to any user who creates the account. Social media sites will rarely become involved in disputes over access to a profile, siding in almost all circumstances with the individual who created the profile, without regard to whether that might violate a separate employment contract, unless trademark or copyright violation allegations are involved, as they were in Mattocks. Thus, the application of ToS, alone, may result in an outcome that is entirely unfair to employers. Furthermore, whether contract law is, or should be, applicable to determine who is entitled to administrative rights is certainly questionable. 141 As a result, possible employment contracts are likely the better avenue. However, they too have their limitations.
Clearly 141 See, e.g., David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CAL. L. REV. 548, 597 (2014) ("The degree to which courts should honor adhesive terms is one of the most fraught issues in modern contract law. The problem is the yawning gulf between contract theory and contract reality: although binding agreements supposedly arise from mutual assent, we are only dimly aware of the fine print spawned by most commercial transactions. Thus, once in a great while, a judge will find that a purported form contract is not a contract at all.") (footnotes omitted).
employment contract designating the rights to the social media profile. The continued stream of cases on this matter evidence, at least casually, that such contract provisions are not widely used in practice, despite the fact that many commentators have recommended their use. 142 However, those contracts that limit ex-employee access to social media may be unenforceable as an overbroad restraint of trade.
Recent cases challenging the validity of noncompete and non-solicitation agreements vis-à-vis social media suggest that courts tend to take an employee-friendly view. Some courts have held that ex-employee posts announcing new employment or inviting social media audiences to view a new employer's website do not violate non-solicitation agreements.
143 At least one court has held that connecting with former clients on Facebook is permissible. 144 Even posting a job opportunity that would likely reach employees that an individual was contractually prohibited from soliciting does not violate non-solicitation agreements if the post is publicly available.
145
One court has even posited that agreements restricting employees from engaging in the above social media interactions would likely be overly broad and unenforceable. 146 McLaughlin argues that a non-compete agreement requiring an employee to transfer rights to a social media account when employment ends (a "forced-transfer" provision) may be fundamentally unfair because it forces an employee into a situation that necessarily requires a breach of contract-either the ToS or the employment contract.
147 "[W]hen employers knowingly induce employees to breach SNS user agreements, courts should acknowledge the unequal bargaining power between the parties, and thus equitably prohibit the enforcement of these agreements." 148 Thus, contract law, while it might be applicable and useful in select cases in which the parties have signed an employment agreement that identifies rights to social media accounts, will often not provide courts with useful tools to resolve these disputes.
3.
Personal Property
As mentioned above, the relationship between a social media site and its user is governed by the site's ToS agreement, which specifically covers whatever property interests may arise through creation of a social media account. One cannot own a social media account in the traditional sense of personal property law. As discussed previously, a look at the ToS agreements of three 142 See Argento, supra note 11, at 226 ("In many cases, parties could avoid disputes by expressly agreeing about which party has the right to control the social network account. Nevertheless, the default rules remain important because some parties will inevitably fail to contract around them. Many companies have no employment agreements for their employees at all, and those that do may fail to address rights to social network accounts. Employment agreements are particularly prone to omitting important issues because employees' roles tend to change over time. 149 Terms of service typically grant members nothing more than a revocable license to use the site. 150 Users do not have rights to convey, transfer, sell, or use their social media profiles in the same way that traditional property ownership would imply.
However, in some respects business social media accounts do indeed provide value to the business with access to customers and potential customers. For instance, as mentioned above, bankruptcy courts have found that business accounts on social media, including pages for businesses run by individual employees, are property interests cognizable as intangible assets under the Bankruptcy Code. 151 In In re CTLI, LLC, the bankruptcy court was faced with the challenge of determining whether a Facebook page was primarily a business or personal asset. 152 Alcede, the debtor, contended that the page in question ("Tactical Firearms") was distinguished from his personal profile and another page he created called "Jeremy Alcede Patriot."
153 Like Kravitz, Eagle, and Maremont, Alcede argued that the page's followers reflected the relationship with an audience he had developed, thus earning him a stake in the page based on the goodwill that had accrued to the account.
154
Even though Alcede wrote posts in the first person and changed the name of the page, the court found that its primary use as a forum to promote the business was persuasive evidence the page was a business page. 155 However, the court made an important distinction, attempting to disentangle professional goodwill from business goodwill. Recognizing that business goodwill is developed by employees of the business over time, the court stated that professional goodwill was that amount of goodwill that is withdrawn when the individual leaves the business; whatever remains is business goodwill, an intangible asset that rightfully accrues to the business and remains with it when the employee leaves. 156 Employees are entitled only to professional goodwill, which the court identified as embodied in the ability of Facebook followers of the 149 See User Agreement, supra note 114; Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 114; Mazzone, supra note 115, at 1648-49. 152 In re CTLI, 528 B.R. at 361. 153 Id. at 369. 154 Id. at 373. 155 Id. at 369-70. 156 Id. at 373.
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Tactical Firearms page to follow Alcede to his personal Jeremy Alcede Patriot page. 157 On the other hand, in Eagle, the plaintiff sought the right to control her social media profile by suing for identity theft and conversion. The court expressed discomfort in applying property-related theories to social media and denied her claim for identity theft, finding that her name was publicly available and therefore not unlawfully possessed. 158 The Eagle court also denied the claim of conversion, noting that intangible property, such as software, domain names and "an intangible right to access a specific page on a computer" cannot be subject to a conversion claim. 159 Although some commentators have advocated for intangible items such as digital assets to be considered personal property, 160 current case law does not suggest any movement in that direction. 
Privacy
A sudden disconnection from one's group or an unwanted association (or disassociation) with a former employer can provoke feelings of intrusion, embarrassment, and anxiety. Such actions may also have economic and professional repercussions. For these reasons, former employees often allege violation of privacy in attempting to regain control over their social media and digital selves. However, courts have floundered in their approaches to privacy online, resulting in disparate results. For instance, the plaintiff in Eagle prevailed on her privacy cause of action yet the court did not award her damages. 162 The Maremont court held that the plaintiff had provided no evidence to support her claim that the defendant employer had intruded upon her seclusion by accessing her social media accounts without consent. 163 Generally, nothing is private on social media. The Supreme Court "consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." 164 Since sharing and interaction are the premises of social media, proving privacy 157 Id. at 373-74. 158 Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 159 Id. at *10. 160 Argento, supra note 11, at 274 ("In general, the law appears to be moving in the direction of finding intangible items such as domain names and phone numbers to be personal property and subject to conversion[;]" noting some cases that have found domain names and phone numbers to be personal property 166 the defendant only allowed his profile to be viewed by his friends, not an extended network of friends of friends, or publicly. Despite these settings, the court held that Meregildo had no justifiable expectation that his Facebook friends would keep his profile private and dissemination of information on his profile by his friends was legal. 167 Even a minor does not have an expectation of privacy on social media. 168 When seventeen-year-old Chelsea Chaney's bikini-clad Facebook photo was used in a school presentation about Internet safety, the court found she had no reasonable expectation of privacy when she shared the photo with the broadest possible audience on her profile. 169 As the vast majority of relevant cases make clear, a social media audience, and its close connection with the user's profile, will not likely be deemed private. 170 Moreover, even if the right to privacy has been violated, plaintiffs may still have difficulty proving damage.
171
The sheer variety of claims and the courts' hesitant approaches to resolving them may be evidence of a lack of understanding of the nature and exercise that these employees performed on social media. Thus, before determining how the law should address post-employment social medial audience retention, a critical examination of the act of social media audience management is required. The following part examines social media, with an eye toward unraveling the nature of the plaintiffs' purported harms, and ultimately, lending support to the application of a new (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating in dicta that "it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.") (citations omitted). 165 See, e.g., Chaney v. Fayette Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315-18 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (finding no violation of due process clause and no unreasonable search and seizure when a high school used a student's semiprivate Facebook photo in a county-wide seminar without the student's knowledge or consent). 166 
II. CONCEPTUALIZING THE VALUE AND EXERCISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
One reason the law is so muddled is because courts and lawmakers battle with conceptualizations of the nature and value of a social media presence. 172 Is a social media audience like an oldfashioned Rolodex or database listing a series of contacts? Or is it more like a corporate business card? Could it ever be as labor-intensive as an advertising campaign or as private as a secret recipe? Evidence of the struggle in understanding social media abounds in the four representative cases above: PhoneDog wondered whether a password could be a trade secret; the Eagle court pondered whether a company could keep a former employee's LinkedIn account; the judge in Maremont had to decide whether it was reasonable for an employer to continue marketing via an absent employee's Facebook account; and in Mattocks, the court had to determine whether a "like" was a verifiable business interest. These are ultimately normative questions whose answers rest not only in interpretations of applicable law, but in accurate characterizations of a digital environment that did not exist a decade ago.
What follows are five tenets that describe the process, the reality, and ultimately the value, of social media audience management. While individuals engage in social media for varied purposes, we focus narrowly on the case where employees promote their employers through social media. For ease of reference, we refer to the employee directing and managing the social media site as the "manager." It is the common act of online socialization, and its resultant relationships, that form the essence of this analysis.
A.
Through Facebook is an "online social network where members develop personalized web profiles to interact and share information with other members."
177 Individuals can create both personal profiles and pages about themselves or others. 178 Profiles and pages can include multimedia, news articles, and personal updates. 179 Facebook users generally have control over their visibility settings and can set their profiles to be public or visible only to the user's "friends." 180 Users see their friends' activity in their "News Feed" on the Facebook home page. 181 "Likes" are "a way for Facebook users to share information with each other" and convey enjoyment or approval without leaving a textual comment. 182 When users "like" content posted on a profile or page, they become connected with it. 183 Once connected, users will see content from that profile or page in their news feed, the page will appear on their profile, and the user will appear on the page as someone who likes that page, as an association or implicit endorsement. 184 In contrast to Facebook's emphasis on the personal, LinkedIn distinguishes itself as a site for individuals to network in a professional capacity. Individuals with whom a user is "linked" see updates to the individual's profile (depending on the individual's notification settings). 185 In keeping with its business-networking culture, LinkedIn profiles have sections for education, associations, honors and awards. 186 LinkedIn users may only maintain one account at a time and may set up company pages only as authorized representatives. Twitter differs greatly from Facebook and LinkedIn because it is not a profile-based network. Its default setting allows users to freely follow each other without prior notice or approval. Users can see the "tweets," 140 character messages that can include a photo or video, of all the accounts they follow. 188 Users can also mention each other in tweets using "@" and the username of another 189 and hashtags ("#") to tag topics. 190 Individuals can create accounts with any username they desire that is not already in use, 191 but the site offers a verification option to "establish authenticity of identities of key individuals and brands on Twitter."
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B. The Social Media Manager Is Spokesperson, Author, and Relationship Administrator
In most instances, a business's primary goal in maintaining an online social media presence is to communicate and build relationships with a large assembly of consumers and constituents, thereby strengthening brand reputation and recognition. The employee charged with maintaining the profile (Twitter feed or Facebook page) may be acting in the capacity of a representative of the employer. Unlike a traditional spokesperson reading from a well-vetted script, the employee must infuse personality into the social media so as to anthropomorphize the company, communicating in a way that creates and sustains relationships.
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In the world of social media, where many compete for attention, it is well recognized that "accounts don't really work unless they have a touch of personality. Tweeted press releases aren't interesting on Twitter; personal wit is regarded above all, and encouraged at every smart firm with a social media presence." 194 As such, to be successful, the social media manager must entertain as well as inform, add value as well as perform. Unlike the traditional author, his written work is published and judged instantaneously; his agility with words, prized. He must also be responsive, reactive, and up-to-date. Ultimately, the objective is to create a relationship with the audience through the persona presented.
Given these varied roles, the process is time-consuming and requires a great deal of effort. One business blogger compared the demands of social media on a business to a hungry baby requiring feeding on a very regular basis. 195 Audience management requires understanding the audience, planning content, and "constant, ubiquitous engagement." 196 Managers must remember identities and connections of individuals in the network and what information has been exchanged, and when. 197 Some companies have been forced to dedicate full-time employees solely to manage social media. 198 According to one study, many business owners and senior executives spend over four hours per day on social media. 199 Because of the time, labor, and personality put in to this effort, one scholar called losing a profile a "harsh blow." 200 
D.C. The Social Media Audience Is Interactive and Highly Dynamic
Social media scholars Alice Marwick and danah boyd have proposed that the medium has changed the relationship between the audience and the broadcaster. 201 The traditional broadcast audience, comprised of a single broadcaster communicating with nonresponsive observers, has evolved into a highly interactive "networked audience." 202 In radio or television broadcasts, oneway content is institutionally created and directed at a passive audience of consumers. A networked audience, on the other hand, is active and connected. 203 Social media allows for participants to both send and receive information in an interactive manner. 204 Audience members participate in the creation of content by adding comments, posting photos, liking, sharing, or "retweeting" posts and comments provided by others.
As a result of this constant interaction, the social media manager is not only a content producer, but also a mediator of the evolving content and relationships that emerge. Social media audiences influence the content an individual produces, and affect how the manager crafts her evolving image. In other words, the audience becomes part of the process of constructing a social media persona. 205 A social media audience becomes so closely tied to the user's persona that the two cannot be separated. It is also highly fluid, changing constantly as individuals and content are added or removed. 206 
E.D. The Social Media Manager Often Works Across Personal and Professional Contexts
Social media renders the line between the professional and personal undeniably blurry. Social media users manage multiple audiences from different life contexts (childhood friends, professional contacts, family, etc.) in a single online platform for varied reasons. Given the unwieldiness and time-consuming nature of managing multiple social media profiles, some choose to consolidate into a single profile or site for efficiency or convenience. Additionally, the very structure or terms of the sites may force users to intermingle audiences. 207 For the avid social media audience manager aiming to broaden his social media presence, this amalgamation may prove useful as it increases his followers, activity, and reach. On the other hand, the erasure of the fine distinctions among audiences may result in what has been referred to as "context collapse." 208 Context collapse involves the forced merging of social and professional contexts, making the individual unable to differentiate self-presentation online. 209 As a result, some users may adjust their behavior "so as to make it appropriate for a variety of different situations and audiences;" 210 others may simply suffer the social repercussions that ensue from dissonant self-presentations.
In addition, employees may intentionally meld personal contacts to increase visibility and networking ability, or may import contacts accumulated prior to their current efforts on behalf of an employer. For example, in the Mattocks case, prior to employment, Mattocks had personally created and managed a fan page devoted to a BET show. Upon joining BET's marketing effort, she amalgamated her prior fan base (amounting to 2 million likes) to her work for BET. 211 The result was a highly successful fan page with ambiguous ownership, which BET ultimately took as its own.
F.E. A Social Media Audience Has Social and Financial Value
A social media audience carries value in terms of social currency, reputation, and personal 28 Vol. 53 / American Business Law Journal brand. 212 Interaction with social media audiences can result in social and dignitary benefits for the individual collector. On a basic level, the individual may experience the relational welfare stemming from strengthened individual bonds and fulfillment at being at the nucleus of a networked group.
Both the social media manager and the business he promotes can also gain significant social capital and business goodwill from a wide, heterogeneous audience. 213 Research conducted by Bain & Company found that customers who engage businesses on social media spend twenty percent to forty percent more with those businesses than other customers and feel greater loyalty to the businesses with which they connect. 214 Other sources have calculated the potential value to the business sector from effective use of social networks to between $900 billion and $1.3 trillion a year. 215 As Marwick observes, upgrading social status through popularity and influence often drives online participation. 216 Acknowledging this need, most social networking sites employ indicators of status and importance, such as Facebook "likes" and Twitter "retweets." 217 Researchers have noted that individuals with an online influence can benefit from resources such as access to useful information, access to individuals outside their own circle, and elevated social status. 218 For the individual, this creates professional goodwill, which can result in concrete benefits such as business and employment connections. 219 Businesses enjoy their own distinct advantages. Enhanced relationships with a broad network of consumers can strengthen reputation, engage current and future customers, and generate profit.
Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt refers to online identity as both "commodity" and "currency." 220 He suggests that in the future, "[i]dentity will be the most valuable commodity for citizens . . . and it will exist primarily online. . . . We are what we tweet." 221 For all of the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraphs, there is ample evidence that the future Schmidt envisions of online identity as a commodity is close, if not here. Marketing strategies once reserved for companies are being applied to individuals. An entire industry has developed around self-branding-assisting individuals in creating a successful identity with which to market themselves widely.
222
Further evidencing the rising value of online identity, social media has led to the democratization of celebrity. Scholars have loosely defined fame as "the informal attribution of distinction on an individual within a given social network." 223 In the twentieth century, businesses began to manufacture individuals' fame as a commodity that was leveraged for profit. 224 Few could attain the level of notoriety that would result in an identity with commercial value.
Today, social media has changed the dynamic of the manufacturing and distribution of celebrity, facilitating a phenomenon known as "micro-celebrity." Micro-celebrity is "the phenomenon of being extremely well known not to millions but to a small group," a few thousand or even a few dozen people. 225 Micro-celebrity, like self-branding, is a construction of identity that can be consumed by others with the audience acting as a fan base. 226 This identity draws a fan base that can be used to promote one's self and monetized through sponsored promotions. 227 Internet scholars have noted that the concept of micro-celebrity "implies that all individuals have an audience that they can strategically maintain through ongoing communication and interaction." 228 Anecdotes abound of people promoting themselves through social media, garnering a following, and translating that self-made fame into lucrative careers. 229 One commentator has observed that this path to success has become "well-trodden." 230 For example, Michelle Phan, a YouTube blogger known for her homemade make-up instruction videos, launched a commercial empire that includes her own line of makeup, a music label, and a lifestyle site. 231 
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Vol. 53 / American Business Law Journal audiences. 232 Linda Eagle's former employer locked her out of her LinkedIn account, causing search results for her name to be redirected to her successor's page. Although the court held in her favor, it did not award her damages because it held that she could not prove a loss of value. 233 Some courts have refused to attach value to what they view as an indeterminate reputational matter or an impermanent asset. 234 In other words, since social media platforms allow members to unilaterally disconnect from the networked group at any time, some have argued that it is a non-static list incapable of ownership and assessable value. 235 Interestingly, however, both bankruptcy courts and the financial industry have recognized the value of social media presence and audiences, no matter now changeable or intangible. The recent bankruptcy cases discussed previously in Part I involving the ownership and valuation of social media profiles conclude that the administrative privileges and associated digital rights are bona fide assets and business goodwill. 236 The Maremont court also recognized value in the plaintiff's Twitter and Facebook followers, noting that they were "a marketable commercial interest." 237 Well-established financial standards and metrics also quantify the value of networked audiences. For instance, some general valuation models divide the number of users on a platform by the company's valuation to determine the monetary value of each user. 238 PhoneDog, in its case against Kravitz, argued that industry standards valued each Twitter follower at $2.50 per month. 239 Other valuation metrics capture factors such as relationships between users, connections of users, and loyalty of users, rather than just numbers. 240 With an understanding of the many claims involved and the burgeoning meaning and value of social media audiences in firmer grasp, the next part proposes that publicity rights, a hybrid of privacy and property law, is an appropriate lens through which to analyze the harm that employees suffer when their digital identities and work product are usurped.
III. USING PUBLICITY RIGHTS RATIONALE TO DETERMINE POST-EMPLOYMENT SOCIAL MEDIA CONTROL
As we have shown above, courts have had difficulty resolving employment cases involving social media retention and balancing competing interests. 241 They have analyzed the issues through the lenses of trade secret, personal property, privacy, and intellectual property rights to little avail. Given that social media is laborious, creative, and often tied to its manager's personality, this section argues that the law of publicity rights offers a fuller, more accurate foundation for the analysis of the post-employment control of social media accounts. As a wellestablished quasi-property claim in identity, publicity rights protect the economic fruit of a person's name and identity. Justified in publicity rights, we contend that individuals should be entitled to protection against those who seek to misappropriate their work, personae, and goodwill for economic gain, except when their work falls squarely in the scope of their employment. However, as discussed in Part II, disentangling the personal from the professional and defining the scope of employment requires surgical precision in the modern world. As such, we propose a framework for application of publicity rights to this novel employment context. Inspired by the precepts of agency and publicity law, our proposed rubric balances the employee's financial, social, and emotional interests in his social media while balancing the employer's legitimate business claims.
A. Applying Publicity Rights to Social Media Personae
The right of publicity is a relatively new quasi-property right that grew out of the privacy tort of commercial appropriation. 242 Historically, an appropriation claim sought recovery for the dignitary and emotional harms that result from unauthorized appropriation of a person's likeness. 243 However, as the practice of celebrity endorsements in advertising grew in the latter half of the twentieth century, it became clear that the identity of public figures carried commercial value-apart from the privacy interests protected by the appropriation tort. 244 An early seminal New York case involved the unauthorized use of the images of major league baseball players in baseball cards. 245 The Second Circuit found-for the first time-that individuals had a property right in their own images. 246 
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Vol. 53 / American Business Law Journal justified in privacy alone. 247 One argument that was particularly persuasive in favor of the new tort was that the time and effort that celebrities invested in themselves carried a real, protectable value. 248 As a result, a handful of states led the emergence of a new tort, the right of publicity, which takes a property-based view of the right to one's likeness, persona, and reputation. 249 Scholars have extensively debated the tort's theoretical underpinnings. 250 What justifies the prevention of the unauthorized commercial appropriation of a valuable persona? One common moral justification for the right centers upon Lockean labor considerations: the person who puts time and energy into creating value in his image is justified in owning the fruit of his labor, reaping its benefits, and preventing others from unjustly enriching from it. 251 Economic rationales for the right are utilitarian in nature, as economic incentives promote creativity and progress and protect consumers from deception. 252 Others point to the importance of individual dignity and autonomy as the driving force for publicity rights. 253 Theories of personhood and autonomy justify publicity rights based upon the inherent link between the self and a person's persona and will likely include indicia of identity such as name and likeness, as demonstrated by the four social media cases discussed earlier. Like traditional celebrities, these employees put in considerable time and effort in their personae. Like the historical justification for granting celebrities publicity rights, there is economic value in their work, their reputations, and their following.
262 From a Lockean perspective, they should enjoy the fruits of their labor, which, as established above, is quite intensive and encompassing in its dynamism. In their capacity as thought-disseminators, social media managers may also carry high endorsement value with their trusted audiences. The plaintiffs in PhoneDog, Maremont, and Mattocks each made their living by sharing their opinions and endorsements in a signature style. Their audiences followed them, seeking out their particular expertise and musings. There is little doubt in the business world that the plaintiffs' actions carried value. In fact, the four employers' actions (in usurping the social media post-employment) are a recognition of this value. However, both Eagle and Maremont failed to remunerate the wronged employees based on their right to publicity. While it acknowledged that Eagle had made a prima facie showing of publicity rights, the Eagle court had trouble with the concept that the temporary hijacking of the employee's LinkedIn could have caused damage-and in fact sought proof that actual damage had occurred. 263 The Maremont court concluded that the employer's act of communicating through an employee's Facebook page without her consent was not an unjust appropriation of her identity.
While the majority of courts today recognize that publicity rights are available to all individuals (regardless of their fame), they often struggle conceptualizing of value of the rights of non-traditional celebrities or nonpublic figures. 264 As more nonpublic individuals garner personality value through their social media efforts, we will likely see more such cases. These cases illustrate the need for a clear rubric to apply publicity rights in the context of social media employment cases.
B. The Employee's Persona Versus the Employer's Asset: A Multi-Factor Analysis for Determining Post-Employment Retention of Social Media
As mentioned above, the four elements of a right of publicity claim are that (1) the defendant used the plaintiff's identity (2) for the defendant's commercial (or other) advantage (3) without (2014) (proposing a "transformative use" test to determine whether an author's creative work which uses the likeness of another has enough creative elements to be considered expression worthy of First Amendment protection). Each of the articles relate to the free speech issues that arise when online personae are used by another for social media marketing or artistic purposes, which is outside the scope of this inquiry. Our focus is different and narrower-employment law and the right to keep relationships that have become inextricably connected to the persona. the plaintiff's consent, (4) causing injury. 265 In the employment context, it is clear that employers often have the right-whether implicit or explicit-to use their employees' identities for their commercial advantage. However, the world of social medial is replete with blurred boundaries and context collapse. 266 More than ever employees mix contacts, worlds, and behavior, sometimes resulting in a lack of clarity regarding whether the employer used the employee's identity wrongfully, without his consent, and caused injury.
The following five-part analysis is intended to provide specific factors that courts could consider to determine the proper post-employment fate of a mixed-use social media account. The rubric is structured with five overarching themes, each undergirded by a series of questions. The themes to examine are: (1) the purpose and nature of the employment relationship; (2) the purpose and nature of the social media account, including its creation; (3) the employer's access or control of the social media account; (4) the degree to which the employee's persona is infused in the forum; and (5) the injury caused by the employer's alleged infringement. We address each theme and factor in detail below. An analysis to determine administrative rights to a social media profile and audience begins by looking at the reasons for which the employee was hired and the nature of the employee's job. Thus, if an employee was hired for a marketing or communications-related post, or was primarily responsible for creating and maintaining social media relationships for the employer, these facts would weigh in favor of employer retention. A court should ask whether building or maintaining a social media audience on behalf of the employer was a critical part of the employee's job description. In PhoneDog v. Kravitz, the employee was hired to be a video blogger, reviewing products and sharing his views on Twitter. 268 Although the employee eventually became a microcelebrity to his followers, this factor would weigh heavily against his continued retention and control of the social media.
On the other hand, if the creation of a social media audience was not part of the employee's work duties, and the employee used a primarily personal social media account to promote the employer's business only occasionally, those facts would indicate that the employer did not have the automatic right to use the employee's identity-and administrative rights would rightfully belong to the employee. In Eagle v. Morgan, an education executive sued for the return of her social media after it was hijacked by her former company. 269 The executive's employment was not premised or contingent on her social media involvement, nor was social media interaction her obligation; hence, this factor would weigh in her favor.
Thus Courts should also consider the purpose and nature of the account, including the facts surrounding its creation. This analysis first considers whether the employee or the employer created the account. If the employee's job required maintenance of an account that had been set up before employment began, that would weigh in favor of the employer's continued right to the audience associated with it. Similarly, if an employee's existing account(s) and social media audience were important factors in her hiring, and the employee brought a majority of the social media audience with her when she began working for the employer, then the presumption would be that the employee is entitled to keep the administrative rights to the profile and its associated audience when employment ends. If the employee created the account after becoming employed, then courts must carefully consider the circumstances surrounding its creation, including who set up the account and whose name is associated with it. Employees who create social media profiles on their own behalves unrelated to their job description have a stronger claim to the account. Timing and location may also be factors. An employee who creates an account during employment may be considered to be acting as an agent for the employer, and thus could have a weaker claim to the associated audience when she leaves. On the other hand, if the employee created the account on her own, this may be indicative that the employee should retain access rights. 270 For instance, in the PhoneDog case, Kravitz claimed "that he created the account on his own initiative to promote his freelance work, including the freelance work he was doing for PhoneDog."
271 If such facts are true, this presumption should apply particularly if the account was used primarily for personal reasons.
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The name and e-mail account officially associated with the account is also an important factor. If the account is set up in the employee's name only, as was Linda Eagle's, 273 the presumption should be that the account remains within the employee's control. In Maremont, the analysis. Here, courts will look at the level of authority the employer maintains over the accounts in question. If part of the employee's job was to cultivate a social media audience, did the employer give guidance as to that presence? Did the employer openly monitor or control the subject forum and postings? The answers to these questions relate to whether maintenance of the account in question was part of the employee's job duties and are closely related to the first two factors. An employer who requires the employee to create a Facebook account, for instance, may be more likely to impose rules on the maintenance of that account.
Courts should also consider who has access to the account and passwords. An employer who has insisted on having administrative rights or maintaining control of the social media accounts or their login information would have a strong argument that the accounts are primarily work-related. 280 For example, in the Mattocks case, the employee was hired for her social media presence and skill in promoting a BET show on Facebook. 281 Upon her employment, she consented to allowing her employer administrative rights to the fan page over which she previously had sole control. 282 This act evidences clear consent and weighs in favor of the cable network. If more than one employee worked on an account, it is likely that the parties did not contemplate that any one employee would have an exclusive right to the account, but if only one employee managed the account this may favor the employee. 283 Thus, questions courts might consider under this third prong include:  Did the employer require employees to maintain and cultivate a social media audience?  Did the employer give guidance as to the employee's social media presence?  Did the employer monitor or control the subject forum and postings?  Did the employer impose rules regarding the subject social media account?  Did the employer legitimately have administrative rights or password information?  Did more than one employee have access to edit and change the account?
Employee Persona
Employees should have a strong claim to social media they created and infused with their own identity and for the purposes of socialization or personal networking. This factor in the analysis requires a close look at the employee's online persona and presence. As mentioned above, many social media audiences are amassed largely through a person's individual expressions of personality, wit, expertise, or flair. 284 The stronger the employee's online identity or indicia of identity, the greater should be the presumption that the employee is entitled to retention. Reflective of publicity rights, this presumption reflects the value of the employee's online persona and prevents the employer from trading on or misappropriating the employee's identity.
Thus, questions courts might consider under this fourth prong include:  Does the social media forum identify the employee by name?  Is the forum infused with the personality and identity of the employee? Was it representative of the individual?  Did the employee enjoy social media recognition or notoriety independent of the employer?  Did the employee write or create the majority of his or her own content?  Did the employee amass the social media audience under his or her own name or was he or she writing anonymously or pseudonymously on behalf of the employer? Employees who attract social media audiences through a variety of accounts have a particularly persuasive argument for publicity rights.
5.
Degree of Injury
Finally, if courts are to apply publicity rights to remedy social media employees, they must broaden their views of celebrity and injury to publicity rights to meet contemporary notions and established law. In 2015, the District Court for the Eastern Division of Illinois held that a grocery chain infringed basketball-great Michael Jordan's publicity rights when it published a print ad in a 2009 commemorative edition of Sports Illustrated magazine congratulating Mr. Jordan on his induction to the Basketball Hall of Fame. 285 The mere association of the business with the famous man-even in a congratulatory context-without his consent triggered a judgment against the defendant of $8.9 million. 286 In contrast, social media employees who have contested their publicity rights have come away with no damages, even when they successfully made a prima facie showing of a violation to their publicity rights. 287 
